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M.H. Ogilvie* Limiting the Legal Liability of Religious
Institutions for their Clergy:
Cavanaugh v Grenville Christian College
The purpose of this article is to explore the case law relating to the potential
legal liability of ecclesiastical institutions for the conduct of their clergy and lay
employees in the tort of negligence, vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary
duty While a number of cases have resulted in findings of liability especially in
those relating to the Indian residential schools, a recent decision from the Ontario
Court of Appeal, Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College, suggests ways of
thinking about the limits and scope of liability for institutions whose charitable
purposes are occasionally betrayed by rogue persons over whom they may have
little control.
Cet article a pour objectif d'examiner la jurisprudence sur la responsabilit6 Idgale
potentielle des institutions ecclsiastiques pour la conduite de leurs membres
et de leurs employes larcs dans les ddlits de negligence, dans les affaires de
responsabilit6 du fait d'autrui et de manquement a I'obligation fiduciaire. Quoique
de nombreux jugements, en particulier ceux qui ont trait aux pensionnats
autochtones, ont conclu a la responsabilit6 des institutions, une decision rdcente
de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario, Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College, suggere
des pistes de rdflexion sur lampleur et les limites de la responsabilit6 pour les
institutions dont les objectifs caritatifs sont parfois trahis par des ddlinquants sur
qui elles peuvent n'avoir que peu de contrle.
* Professor of Law and Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, Ottawa, and of the Bars of
Ontario and Nova Scotia.
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Introduction




The legal liability of ecclesiastical dioceses for the misconduct of clergy
acting within the geographical boundaries of a diocese has been considered
by a handful or two of cases over the past two decades in the context of the
tort of negligence, vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty. In most
cases, the courts have found, on the facts, that the diocese bears liability
for the harms done to children and other vulnerable persons, but in a few
cases the diocese has been found not to be liable on the facts. An important
example of the latter result is the recent decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College.' The Diocese
of Ontario (whose cathedral is in Kingston) in the Anglican Church of
Canada (ACC) was found not liable to students who alleged negligence,
vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty against the diocese for
alleged acts by two priests, ordained but not licensed by the diocese, who
were headmasters of a private school, Grenville Christian College, and
several members of the school staff.2 The reasons for this outcome were
found in the facts relating to the extent to which the diocese could be said
to be responsible for unlicensed priests operating a private school within
a diocese, which was not an enterprise either authorized or recognized by
the diocese. The case highlights the importance of facts in determining
whether there is legal liability on the part of a diocese.
The purpose of this article is to distill the factual requirements for
imposing legal liability on a diocese, with a view to assisting litigants
and courts in future cases as well as assisting ecclesiastical organizations,
which do not wish to harm vulnerable persons but rather to serve their
best interests, to structure their internal affairs so as to avoid liability by
1. Cavanaugh v Grenville Christian College, 2013 ONCA 139, 360 DLR (4th) 670 [Cavanaugh].
2. Although the diocese is no longer a defendant in the action as a result of the decision by the
Ontario Court of Appeal, the class action onbehalf of the students continues against the school and the
headmasters. This article is restricted to consideration of the issues involving the diocese which have
been resolved finally.
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rogue persons over whom they have little control. Religious institutions
which ordain persons should no more be liable by that fact alone than
are professional licensing bodies of lawyers, doctors, dentists, etc. for the
misfeasances of the persons whom they approve to provide professional
services to the public-at least, at this time!
At the outset, it is important to make several assertions so as to frame
the discussion that follows and to define its limits. First, the legal principles
relating to negligence, vicarious liability and fiduciary obligation at
issue in these cases are no different in content than in other cases in
other areas of the law. Thus, the content of these principles will not be
expressly discussed, but rather, following the example of the courts, will
be assumed and applied in the contexts at issue. The content of vicarious
liability is a partial exception because it was further developed in this
context specifically beyond its original formulation in tort law generally;
negligence and fiduciary duty do not require separate consideration of
their constituent principles. Secondly, since the cases before Cavanaugh
have been analyzed elsewhere,3 the discussion will again assume and work
from earlier analyses, so that there will be no separate discussion of these
cases except insofar as they illuminate the discussion below. Thirdly, the
focus of this paper, like that of the preponderance of the cases, will be on
episcopal polities, that is, churches which are internally organized around
a bishop in a diocese. Virtually all of the cases are concerned with the two
main episcopal polities in Canada, the Roman Catholic Church and the
Anglican Church of Canada. There are no relevant cases concerned with
other episcopal polities, for example, the various Lutheran, Methodist and
Orthodox churches. Nor are there any cases about churches organized
solely on a congregational basis. There are a few cases about one church
organized on a presbyterian basis, that is, the United Church of Canada,
which follows the classical Reformed structure of organization based on
tiered church courts (session, presbytery, synod, general council). There
are no cases involving non-Christian religious institutions; however,
because these are largely organized on a congregational basis with a
single, local, not-for-profit incorporation, any future cases would likely
treat the local organization as the liability bearing body. (Included in this
statement would be Jewish, Islamic and the various "Eastern" religions.)
3. See generally Elizabeth KP Grace & Susan M Vella, Civil Liability for Sexual Abuse and
iolence in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000). For a brief overview of the cases relating to
religious institutions, see MH Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2010) at 3 16-323 and the literature cited therein
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Fourthly, the particular, heart-rending details of the abuses at issue will not
be discussed but assumed as the background to the discussion.
I. Cavanaugh v. Grenville Christian College
Five former boarders at Grenville Christian College (GCC) brought a
motion to certify a class action against the two headmasters, the College
and the diocese on behalf of other students, alleging physical, sexual
and psychological abuse while at the College, and seeking damages of
$225 million. The action was framed in negligence, vicarious liability
and fiduciary obligation. The students alleged that GCC and the two
headmasters soughtto indoctrinate the students in the teaching and practices
of the Community of Jesus, a religious community based in Orleans,
Massachusetts,' and that the diocese failed to intervene to ensure that GCC
promoted the teaching, practices and values of the Anglican Church. The
motions judge refused to certify the claims against the headmasters and
GCC because the students had not demonstrated that a class proceeding
was the preferable procedure. This finding was appealed to the Divisional
Court which overturned the decision of the motions judge and permitted
the class action to be certified and to proceed against the headmasters
and the College.' The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this decision.6 The
action against the diocese was dismissed by the motions judge and upheld
by the Ontario Court of Appeal, so that the case against the diocese has
come to an end while that against the other defendants is proceeding.
Before the motions judge, the plaintiffs' claim in negligence against
the diocese was based on the existence of a duty of care' as alleged by
them in the affiliation of the school with the diocese; the ordination and
alleged licensing as priests of the diocese of the two headmasters, holding
out of the school as an Anglican school and the bishop's knowledge of the
practices of the Community of Jesus at the school.' However, the court
rejected the existence of a duty of care of the diocese to the students on
the ground that the action was built on the false premise that because GCC
represented itself as an Anglican school and the diocese knew about it, the
diocese owed a duty of care. Rather, the diocese was not subject to a duty to
intervene simply because the GCC claimed to be an Anglican institution.9
4. <www.communityofjesus.org>.
5. Cavanaugh v Grenville Christian College, 2014 ONSC 290, 237 ACWS (3d) 589.
6. Cavanaugh, supra note 1.
7. The court relied on the test for the existence of negligence inAnns v Merton LBC, [1978] AC
728, as applied in numerous cases by the Supreme Court of Canada: Cavanaugh v Grenville Christian
College, 2012 ONSC 2995 at para 78, [2012] OJ No 2293 [Cavanaugh ONSC].
8. Cavanaugh ONSC, supra note 7 at para 88.
9. Ibid at para 89.
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Moreover, even if a duty of care existed, it was not reasonably foreseeable
that because the GCC purported to be Anglican that the diocese would owe
a duty to the students.o Nor was there proximity between the diocese and
the students because there was no relationship between the diocese and the
school; the diocese did not own or contract with the school; there was no
employment relationship with the headmasters; there was no control by or
corporate or organizational relationship with the diocese, nor any diocesan
right or duty to intervene; nor did parents receive advice from the diocese
about the GCC.11 The relationship was too remote for there to be a cause
of action against the diocese.1 2 It was not enough to create a duty situation
that the diocese had ordained the headmasters and that Anglican liturgy
was celebrated in the chapel.1 3The motions judge rejected the vicarious
liability argument as well."4 There was no sufficiently close relationship
between the diocese and the school to make the importation of vicarious
liability appropriate or fair: there was no employment relationship; the
school was not acting on behalf of the diocese but was an independent,
autonomous institution founded prior to the ordinations; and again,
the diocese exercised no autonomous power or control or legal right to
intervene in the affairs of the school; nor did the diocese introduce the
risks of harm to the students atthe school. The motions judge made equally
short work of the breach of fiduciary duty allegation: the diocese had no
relationship of trust with the students; the students were not dependent on
the diocese; the diocese had no direct relationship with the students; nor
did the diocese undertake to act with loyalty to the students. "The Ontario
Court of Appeal agreed with these findings. In assessing the negligence
claims, the court applied the two-part Anns test:1 6 (i) do the facts fall
within a previously recognized category of cases so that a prima facie
duty of care arises; but (ii) if they do not, should a new duty of care be
recognized as determined by the foreseeability of harm and proximity of
10. Ibidatpara 91.
11. Ibidatpara92.
12. The motions judge rejected the analogy with Re Residential Indian Schools, 2002 ABQB 667,
222 DLR (4th) 124 [Residential] on the ground that there was diocesan control in that case.
13. Cavanaugh ONSC, supra note 7 at para 97. In addition to ordination, an Anglican diocese
only asserts control over priests who are also licensed to exercise their powers in the diocese by
appointment of the bishop: see canons 17(1), (b), (c); 17(2)(a); 17(5)(a), (b); 17(7) of the Constitution
of the General Synod, Handbook of the General Synod of The Anglican Church of Canada, 17th ed
(2013) at 76-78 <www.anglicanca/resources/handbook> [Handbook].
14. Bazley v Curry, [1999] 2 SCR 534; Jacobi v Griffiths, [1999] 2 SCR 570; B(KL) v British
Columbia, 2003 SCC 51, 230 DLR (4th) 513 [B(KL)]; G(ED) v Hammer, 2003 SCC 52, 230 DLR
(4th) 554 [G(ED)]; B(M) v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 53, 230 DLR (4th) 567 [B(M)].
15. Cavanaugh ONSC, supra note 7 atparas 109-110.
16. Cavanaugh ONSC, supra note 7.
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relationship? Once a duty of care is made out, a court should proceed to
any policy considerations thatjustify negating that duty, so there is no legal
liability. "The students' argument that the facts constituted a recognized
duty situation was premised on several cases in which the courts found that
a diocese is liable in negligence for priests working within that diocese."
However, Doherty J.A., for the court, rejected this broad reading of these
cases because in them the diocese appointed and controlled the priests in
question whose relationship with the diocese was akin to an employment
relationship. That was not the case on the facts in Cavanaugh.19 Turning
to the issue of whether a new duty situation could be found on the facts,
the court addressed two allegations relating to foreseeability of harm, that
the diocese knew the two headmasters were members of the Community
of Jesus and followed its teachings at GCC, and that the diocese was or
should have been aware of staff abuse and ought to have reported it to the
appropriate authorities and parents. The court concluded that the pleadings
did not disclose sufficient detail to determine the foreseeability of harm
to the students.20 Nor did the court find sufficient proximity between the
diocese and the students to warrant a duty of care: there was no direct
relationship, no representations or reliance, and no contact at all between
diocese and the students.21 Nor was there any direct relationship set out in
the pleadings between the diocese and the school and its headmasters: there
was no control or supervision, no employment or disciplinary relationship,
and no evidence that ordination made any difference at all at the school.22
In fact, in the absence of a duty of care, the negligence claim failed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal did not expressly address vicarious
liability. It could be argued that the court's analysis of negligence
assimilated some elements of vicarious liability, in particular, with respect
to the relationship of the diocese to the school and the two headmasters.
The court relied on cases about vicarious liability and placed emphasis
on those factual elements which are required for a successful vicarious
liability claim, such as enterprise, control, employment and discipline.
Otherwise it is not clear why the court ignored the issue since it is an
excellent way to link a diocese with a priest where the diocese is not itself
at fault in relation to the victims but is in relation to the priest.
17. Cavanaugh, supra note 1 atparas 45-46.
18. K(W) v Pornbacher, 32 BCLR (3d) 360 [Pornbacher]; Swales v Glendenning, 237 DLR (4th)
304 [Glendenning]; John Doe v Bennett, 2004 SCC 17, [2004] 1 SCR 436 [Bennett].
19. Cavanaugh, supra note 1 atparas 64-68.
20. Ibid at paras 71-73.
21. Ibidatparas 74-75.
22. Ibid at paras 76-78.
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The court, however, did dismiss quickly the fiduciary duty issue. If
there was insufficient proximity between the diocese and students to found
a claim in negligence and if the diocese was not in a position to exercise
power over the diocese, there could be no basis for a fiduciary claim.23
Thus, the case against the diocese failed at both the certification motion
and appeal of that motion, with the result that the case will now proceed
against the school and the two headmasters only.
On the assumption that there are no further allegations about the
role of and relationship of the diocese to the school, headmasters and
students, and that those allegations would have been found as facts at a
trial of the substantive issues, some observations may be made about what
facts may be required generally to make dioceses liable in negligence,
vicarious liability or fiduciary obligation. To do so, it is useful to review
the allegations in Cavanaugh in relation to the diocese as a baseline for
discussion: (i) the two headmasters were ordained as priests in the diocese;
(ii) the two headmasters were not appointed to any position in the diocese
nor to the position of headmaster of the private, autonomous school;
(iii) the school was not a school, parish, church, or any other enterprise
of the diocese; (iv) the diocese did not own, direct, fund, manage,
operate, supervise or administer the school, nor did it appoint, approve
or have power to discipline or dismiss any of the staff, (v) the diocese
did not advise parents to send children to the school or give any advice
of any kind about the school whatsoever; (vi) the school was founded
independently of the diocese and about nine years before the ordination
of the headmasters; (vii) the diocese had no official representation to the
school; (viii) diocesan bishops attended occasional functions at the school
but so too did representatives from other religious institutions as well as
secular officials; (ix) the school represented itself as an Anglican school
but not as being part of the ACC; (x) school chapel services, which were
voluntary for non-Anglican students, used Anglican liturgy; (xi) the school
flew the flag of the ACC; and (xii) the diocese claimed that it had never
received complaints about alleged abuses at the school and had no direct
involvement in or knowledge, nor ought to have knowledge, of alleged
abuses.
With the exception of the twelfth point, the truth or falsity of which
was never confirmed because no fact findings were ever made, the other
eleven assertions neither simply nor collectively amount to an official
institutional connection between GCC and the Diocese of Ontario. At
most, if there was fault on the part of the diocese, it consisted in ordaining
23. Ibid at paras 79-80.
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the two headmasters in the first place and of not insisting that the school
make clear in its publications, website, brochures, and so on that it was not
a part of the diocese or an official institution of the diocese or the ACC.
Since the two headmasters had previously been ordained by other Christian
churches and had satisfied the additional educational and other suitability
requirements forAnglican ordination without raising concerns, it is difficult
to fault the diocese on the ordination issue. In any case, licensing by the
diocese and appointment to a diocesan position would also be required to
connect an Anglican priest and bishop in Anglican canon law, so that mere
ordination should count for nothing in the assessment of fault. Moreover,
it would have been difficult to stop the school from presenting itself as an
Anglican school short of a judicial order analogous to a trademark or trade
name enforcement to ensure a clear distinction between the school and the
church is publicly evident. It would be especially difficult to ensure that
the Anglican liturgy was not used in the school chapel since people are
generally free to worship as they wish. Everyone is free to use whatever
modes of worship drawn from whatever sources, including organized
religious institutions, in their devotions. To seek a judicial restraint order
would have been a most unusual thing to do at the time, especially as
there was apparently no diocesan knowledge of alleged abuse at the
school, although to do so would likely have resulted in making litigation
against the school unthinkable on the basis of the absence of connections
between the school and the diocese. In addition, had there been diocesan
knowledge of alleged abuses, then the diocese would have been under the
same legal duty as everyone else in society to report to the appropriate
authorities.2 4Had the Ontario Court ofAppeal decided that the diocese was
liable, at least vicariously, because it did not take steps to disassociate itself
from the school, a huge step would have been taken in the law not taken
in other contexts. The common law does not attribute liability to a party
simply because a wrongdoer has associated itself with that party. Otherwise
those engaged in wrongful activities could cheerfully associate themselves
with innocent others in possession of deeper pockets from which to pay
any assessed damages or fines. Thus, in the absence of any culpability on
the part of the diocese either directly (negligence, fiduciary obligation)
or indirectly (vicarious liability), Cavanaugh in relation to the diocese
is undoubtedly correct. But it is salutary to compare this outcome with
previous cases in which dioceses have been found liable in order to decide
which outcome is appropriate on the facts. The question is important for
religious institutions because many become involved in varying degrees
24. Every province now has some requirements. See on a province-by-province basis.
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with various charitable or educational activities in their communities, and
are too often naive to their potential detriment when wrongdoing occurs.
When, then, does a diocese or equivalent ecclesiastical body cross the line
into legal liability for the wrongdoing of others?
There are a number of constituent elements in any answer to this
question: (i) the nature of a diocese or equivalent ecclesiastical body
considered in the context of its internal law, (ii) the nature of a diocese in the
common law, (iii) the types of relationships it may have to various persons
who carry out its works, (iv) the common law categories of liability that
may arise from these relationships, and (v) how a diocese might control or
limit its legal liability when persons whom it has authorized in some sense
engage in wrong doing. Each of these topics has been or could be the topic
of entire books, but the present purpose is to show how they fit together
and have been assessed by the courts in the contexts of the cases to date
in Canada. Most of these cases come from the Indian residential schools
litigation or involve foster parents or other situations in which children can
be subjected to abuse.
II. Discussion
The first issue in these cases is to establish whether there is a link between
the diocese or other ecclesiastical body and the perpetrator of the alleged
wrongful conduct. Without a factual link there can be no legal liability
either directly in negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, or indirectly
in vicarious liability. To ascertain a link, it is necessary to understand
the internal law and governance structure of the religious institution to
the extent of understanding the jurisdiction to appoint, supervise and
discipline in relation to officially recognized positions. As stated at the
outset, most cases have involved religious institutions that are episcopal
in nature, that is, divided into geographical jurisdictions called dioceses
led by a bishop.2 5 Christian religious institutions that are presbyterian
in organization are also organized on a geographical basis but governed
by a hierarchy of representative bodies (session, presbytery, synod,
general assembly). Those that are congregational are governed locally by
designated leaders within the local assembly. Almost all non-Christian
religious institutions are governed at the local level by designated leaders
of individual synagogues, mosques, temples, and so on.
Where a religious institution is episcopal, virtually all decisions about
diocesan works are made at the diocesan level, occasionally on the basis
25. For a more extended discussion ofthose organizational arrangements, episcopal, presbyterian and
congregational, see Ogilvie, supra note 3 at ch 3. See also Norman Doe, Christian Law, Contemporary
Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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of policy directions from a national church body, but always implemented
and supervised by the diocesan bishop. While local parish decisions are
made by the priest appointed by the bishop, assisted by lay leaders within
the parish, the priest is responsible to the bishop for the conduct of parish
affairs. Ultimately, the bishop is responsible for the affairs of the entire
diocese. The canon law of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC)2 6 and of the
ACC2 7 clearly posit responsibility, and therefore, liability with the bishop
acting on behalf ofthe diocese. Since all dioceses are incorporated pursuant
to the civil law, either by virtue of their own private acts or occasionally
pursuant to general not-for-profit corporations legislation, the financial
resources available for civil law damages awards are located in the diocesan
corporation. In light of the extensive jurisdiction and power of a diocesan
bishop, financial responsibility for civil wrongdoing ultimately resides
with the diocese. Bishops ordain, license and appoint all priests as well
as other categories of church workers in diocesan enterprises, although
local parishes typically appoint musicians, administrative and custodial
staff with ultimate responsibility to the bishop. However, as Cavanaugh
indicates, mere ordination is not tantamount to a position of authority.
Rather, the further steps of licensing to exercise priestly functions and
appointment to a position where those functions are actually exercised is
also required. Thus, to engage diocesan liability, it is necessary that the
alleged wrongdoer also be validly appointed to a position by a bishop.
In religious institutions organized on a non-episcopal basis, it is
necessary to go through the same process of identifying which person or
body has internal authority to appoint and to ensure that the process has
been followed if civil liability is to result for wrongdoing. In presbyterian
structures, this is typically the presbytery2 8 and in congregational structures,
the local congregation in accordance with its own constitution.2 9Since a
diocese is also part of a larger national or international church, it may
also be involved in activities determined by that larger body such as
missions, both domestic and foreign, colleges, schools and eleemosynary
endeavours. Thus, a court may have to determine which church entity is
responsible for appointment, supervision and discipline. The difficulties in
doing so were demonstrated in several cases concerned with both the ACC
26. Ernest H Caparros, Michel Theriault & Jean Thorn, eds, Code of Canon Law Annotated,
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1993) at canons 375-402.
27. Handbook, supra note 13 at canons 17-18. For the specifics of the role of a bishop within a
diocese, see also diocesan canons available online at diocesan websites.
28. For the United Church of Canada, see The Manual (2013) s 6.4 at 34 <www.united-church.ca/
files/handbook/manual-2013.pdf>; for The Presbyterian Church in Canada, see The Book of Forms
(2013) ss 198-250 at <www.presbyterian.ca/resources>.
29. Each congregation must be considered separately.
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and the RCC. In relation to the ACC, in B.M. v. Mumford,3 0 the complainant
alleged sexual and physical assault against two Anglican priests, one also
a bishop, and sued the diocese, the synod of the diocese, the ACC and
the General Synod of the ACC. Both synods were incorporated pursuant
to their own respective legislation. The British Columbia Supreme Court
dismissed the case against the ACC and its General Synod on the ground
that they had no role in the licensing, employment or general supervision
and control over the priest,3 1 nor over the ordination as bishop ofthe bishop
who was selected by the diocesan synod. Rather, the diocese and the
diocesan synod respectively exercised the necessary control over the two
men. The Ontario Superior Court came to the same conclusion in Lariviere
v. Hilton,32 dismissing complaints of sexual assault by a priest against the
ACC and its General Synod because they had no legal relationship with
the priest against whom the complaints were made.
Two other cases involving the ACC were more complex because they
involved Indian residential schools, and therefore also involved potential
liability of the Crown and Anglican missionary societies involved in
the schools. In ES.M v. Clarke,3 3 the complainant had been repeatedly
assaulted by a dormitory supervisor at a residential school who was a
layperson. The defendants were the ACC, the General Synod of the ACC,
the diocese in which the school was located, the synod of the diocese and
the Crown. The ACC was alleged to be implicated through a missionary
society created by the ACC to administer the schools on its behalf. Clarke
was employed by the principal of the school and paid from the school's
budget, but subsequent reorganization of the respective roles of the church
and the government resulted in Clarke becoming a public servant. The
principal subsequently reported to the government in respect of secular
matters and to the diocesan bishop in respect of spiritual matters at the
school. The court expressly noted that the various Anglican defendants
did not differentiate among themselves at the trial,3 4 and no reason was
given for this. The court found the "Anglicans" and the government to
be vicariously liable and negligent, and the "Anglicans" to be in breach
of a fiduciary duty because they undertook to look after the students to
the exclusion of the government. Although the court allocated liability 60
percent to the Anglicans and 40 percent to the government, it permitted the
30. M(B) vMumford, 2000 BCSC 1787, 84 BCLR (3d) 146.
31. The court applied the standard control test in relation to employees at the time: Robitaille v
Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd (1981), 30 BCLR 286.
32. Lariviere v Hilton (2002), 207 DLR (4th) 765.
33. M(FS) v Clarke, [1999] BCJ No 1973.
34. Ibid at paras 118-119.
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governmentto claim third party relief against the diocese because there was
a breach of contract with the diocese whereby the diocese had promised
to provide pastoral care for the students and did not do so properly. Thus,
insofar as possible, given the collective defence of the Anglican entities,
the court attempted to distinguish them for liability purposes.
In the final ACC case, Re Residential Indian Schools,35 involving
some 500 claimants who attended residential schools, two of the dioceses,
Calgary and Athabasca, and the General Synod of the ACC, moved to
have the actions against them dismissed because they were not involved
in Anglican residential schools situated in those dioceses geographically.
Rather, they argued liability should lie with the missionary society of the
ACC, a federally incorporated body, which operated the schools. The
diocese of Calgary was responsible for schools located in the diocese
prior to 1919 and the diocese of Athabasca was responsible prior to 1923.
However, the missionary society was responsible after these dates and
until 1969 when the federal government took over responsibility for the
schools. The General Synod was never directly responsible and the court
dismissed the case against it. In relation to the diocese of Calgary, the
court limited the case to the periods before 1919 and after 1969 because
the diocese may have played a limited role by providing chaplains on a
contractual basis, although the existence of the contracts had yet to be
proven. In relation to the diocese of Athabasca, the court also limited the
case to the periods before 1923 and after 1969 for the same reasons, but in
this case, there was a contractual arrangement after 1969 for the diocese
to run a student residence in one of the schools located in the diocese and
there was a claimant in relation to that school. The court also dismissed
claims that the corporate veil among the various Anglican entities should
be pierced, applying the standard three-fold test of fraud, agency and alter
ego or fiction,3 6 to conclude that none of those factors was present in the
relationship among the Anglican corporate entities.
Similar care is shown by the courts in establishing whether there
is a link between a diocese and an alleged perpetrator of wrongful acts
in cases involving the RCC. In some cases, this link was clear because
the priest was appointed by the bishop to the positions in which the
wrongful act occurred,3 7 and the courts have found that the relationship
between a priest and a bishop within a diocese is "akin to" an employment
35. Residential, supra note 12.
36. Ibid at paras 146-169.
37. Bennett, supra note 18; Glendining, supra note 18. CfPornbacher, supra note 18.
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relationship.3 8 Therefore the necessary control requirements are present.
On the other hand, a priest working within a parish who was found
guilty of abusing young boys in a completely different context, that is,
while organizing camping activities for a non-church institution run by a
province, resulted in vicarious liability for the province but no liability for
the diocese because the link in relation to the wrongful conduct was with
the provincial institution and not the church.3 9Somewhat more difficult
cases are concerned with lay employees of ecclesiastical enterprises. In
E.B. v Order of the Oblates ofMary Immaculate in the Province ofBritish
Columbia,"4 the claimant was repeatedly assaulted by an Aboriginal baker
at a residential school who lived in a dormitory for employees at the
school. The Supreme Court of Canada found that there was no liability
on the part of the school or the order which ran the school and appointed
the baker because there was no strong connection between his work as a
baker and the wrongful conduct. The baker was not permitted to be with
the students, the residence was off-limits to the students, the acts did not
further the employee's aims, and no power or responsibility was conferred
on the baker in relation to the students. The fact that the school appointed
the baker and required him to live at the school appears not to have been
considered by the court, although these offered him ample opportunity
for contact with the students.41With the exception of EB., appointment by
a bishop, or other ecclesiastical authority, such as an order, to a church-
sponsored position is the key factor linking the perpetrator to the religious
institution for potential liability or negligence, vicarious liability or breach
of fiduciary duty. Cavanaugh confirms this trajectory. These cases also
confirm that by virtue of incorporation as civil law entities, financial
liability for wrongful acts by those lawfully appointed pursuant to the
internal law of a religious institution will be met from the civil law assets
of those religious institutions. The legal nature of a diocese qua diocese
from the perspective of the common law is irrelevant because by also
adopting a civil law persona, a diocese has become a civil law person like
any other corporate person.
38. Bennett, ibid at para 27. See also MH Ogilvie, "Are Members of the Clergy Without the Law?
Hart vRoman Catholic Episcopal Corporation ofthe Diocese ofKingston" (2014) 39 Queens U 441,
for an analysis of recent Canadian and English jurisprudence on the issue.
39. Rich v Bromley Estate, 2013 NLCA 24, 336 Nfid & PEIR 107.
40. B(E) v Order ofthe Oblates ofMary Immaculate (British Columbia), 2005 SCC 60, [2005] 3
SCR 45.
41. CfP(V) v Canada (AG), 1999 SKQB 180, 186 SaskR 161; W(D) v Canada (AG), 1999 SKQB
187, 187 Sask R 21.
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The case law generally in this area suggests that there can be a variety
of relationships which religious institutions might have with those who
carry out its mission. The most obvious is that between religious institution
and clergy which is akin to an employment relationship, in which control is
present from appointment to dismissal. 42 But as Cavanaugh shows, liability
for wrongful acts does not extend to clergy who are merely ordained but
hold no formal appointment. Although there is no case law, it seems
self-evident that clergy who hold appointments which are not pastoral
positions within a parish or congregation, for example, as missionaries
whether domestic or foreign, theological college faculty, institutional
chaplains, or musicians, would be treated in the same way by virtue of
formal appointment to institutional positions. More difficult to classify
are administrators and custodial staff whose positions do not necessarily
entail direct contact with vulnerable persons, although the opportunities
for contact abound, as shown in EB. These cases require case-by-case
factual analysis to determine whether the legal requisites for liability in
negligence, vicarious liability or fiduciary obligation are present.
But the Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned against automatic
findings of liability in analogous fact situations to those in cases involving
religious institutions. In E.D.G. v. Hammer,43 the Court found that a
school board was not liable for a janitor who assaulted a student because
the board had no reason to believe the janitor would do so. There is no
vicarious liability merely because an organization provides a person with
an opportunity to commit a tort. Nor was the relationship between the
board and the student fiduciary, so that the board was not required to act
in the best interests of the student. Again, in MB. v. British Columbia,
the Court found that a provincial government is not vicariously liable for
torts committed by foster parents against children in their care because
the foster parents are not acting on behalf of the government. In KL.B.
v. British Columbia,5 which was also concerned with abuse by foster
parents, the Court explained that there was no vicarious liability because
the government deliberately leaves foster parents with responsibility for
running their home so as to parallel family life as much as possible. 46 The
court further found that while the relationship of government and child
was fiduciary because the government is the legal guardian of the children,
the government was not in breach of the fiduciary duty because it did
42. Bennett, supra note 38.
43. G(ED), supra note 14.
44. B(M), ibid.
45. B(KL), ibid.
46. Ibid at para 23.
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not put its interests ahead of the children nor commit acts which harmed
the children in any way amounting to a betrayal of loyalty. These cases
suggest that liability in tort or fiduciary obligation does not always follow
from being in a position in which there is contact with vulnerable persons
without some greater degree of authority or responsibility in relation to
such persons. Therefore, it does not automatically follow that employees
of religious institutions such as administrators or janitorial staff would
trigger legal liability by their wrongful acts for their employers.
In light ofthe foregoing, it remains to suggest in what situations religious
institutions, especially those organized on an episcopal basis, might be
legally liable for the torts and breaches of fiduciary duty by those entrusted
with carrying out their mission in some capacity. The cases to date show
that only two categories of persons will be potential sources of liability:
(i) clergy who have been ordained, licensed and formally appointed to
recognized positions within the religious institution, including to parishes
or congregations as well as other recognized positions in colleges, schools,
missions, and eleemosynary enterprises which are part of the enterprise of
religious institution; and (ii) other persons who are either employees proper
or recognized volunteers, including musicians, teachers and pastoral care
workers who have contact with vulnerable persons in the regular exercise
of their appointed functions. Equally, the cases show that there are two
categories of persons who will not, prima facie, be potential sources of
legal risk for a religious institution: (i) clergy, by virtue only of having been
ordained, but do not hold any formal appointments or voluntary positions
within the religious institution by which they were ordained; and (ii)
persons who are appointed to administrative or janitorial positions, or are
independent contractors performing building or equipment maintenance or
providing some other service, who are not in positions involving authority
over or contact with vulnerable persons by virtue of the terms of their
appointment. In the absence of knowledge or reasons for suspicion about
their conduct, the religious institution is unlikely to be found legally liable
for their wrongful acts.
The final problem is how religious institutions might protect
themselves from liability for wrongful acts perpetrated in breach of
their moral values and legal standards over and above the techniques
employed by other organizations, which include exercising due diligence
in the appointment process, appropriate oversight in the performance of
appointed duties, clear employment guidelines, immediate investigation
of complaints, a transparent and timely review process for a complaint,
appropriate discipline, and, potentially, dismissal in accordance with the
law. However, there are some distinctive features of religious institutions
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and the persons they ordain or otherwise appoint to leadership roles to
carry out their mission which suggest consideration of additional steps
to limit legal liability for unauthorized wrongful acts. These distinctive
features include the fact that ordination alone does not entail appointment
to a formal position, whether paid or voluntary; that ordained clergy
relatively frequently find other forms of employment either interspersed
with ecclesiastical appointments or after deciding to move permanently
into purely secular employment; that religious institutions tend to be very
forgiving places where personal failings can be overlooked, sometimes
wrongly; that close supervision of the conduct of parish or congregational
life is rarely undertaken while opportunities to cover up wrongful acts
abound; and that much of the life of religious institutions depends on the
good will of those involved because perpetrators of wrongful acts remain
very rare (notwithstanding the widespread publicity when they occur).
In light of these factors which point toward being alert to the rare
perpetrator of wrongful acts, religious institutions might consider some
additional safeguards beyond those of secular employment to limit their
legal liability. First, as Cavanaugh suggests, because mere ordination can
raise the possibility of liability, some greater scrutiny may be warranted
at that time for clergy who are not immediately appointed to a formal
position or who subsequently vacate a formal position, because they
are not subject to the supervision associated with such positions. The
implication that ordination amounts to a seal of approval can be difficult
to rebut but some steps such as online listings of clergy and their positions
on official websites should suggest to a court that not being listed means
no formal supervision or appointment. It may also be appropriate to
establish a register and annual reporting system for ordained persons not
holding formal appointment as to their employment or volunteer positions
similar to those required for lawyers and many other professionals by their
professional societies. Keeping track of such persons could be construed
as a form of control bringing possible legal liability, but could also be
construed as a method of segregating them from ordained persons under
formal appointment and supervision. By making clear at the outset that the
latter reason is the purpose, the religious institution should be in a better
position than with the former reason in relation to any litigation. Those
who voluntarily seek ordination should not find this requirement overly
offensive because its purpose is to ensure that there is no responsibility
for the conduct of an ordained person not under some measure of control.
Secondly, it may be appropriate for dioceses or their equivalents
in non-episcopal religious institutions to take steps to disassociate
themselves from the activities of those they have ordained when they
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learn of inappropriate identification by those persons with the work of the
religious institution. This could be effected in a fact-specific way, including
direct requests to the person to refrain from inferring association, direct
communication with those who may be impacted by the association, or
statements on an official website setting out clearly and explicitly those
enterprises associated with the diocesan mission, with the implication that
all others are not. In a few circumstances, an injunction or other legal
step to restrain identification might also be required. Thirdly, religious
entities might generally consider having clear and explicit statements
on their websites and in the other published material about who is or is
not involved officially in the enterprise; this might include appropriate
responses to telephone inquiries as well.
Finally, religious institutions themselves might consider limiting in
some way the significance of mere ordination for those who do not work
within the organization. This suggestion is theologically very controversial
because all have a theological understanding of ordination and most
consider ordination to be for life regardless of whether the ordination
is exercised by the ordained person. Withdrawal of ordination-de-
frocking-is understood as the final disciplinary measure for very serious
misconduct, and for that reason is rarely an option. Withdrawal of a
licence is also inappropriate because licensing is normally associated with
approval to hold a formal position. However, requiring an application for
or a renewal of a licence wherever appointment to a position is imminent
could suggest that those who are ordained, but do not presently hold a
licence to function as a member of the clergy, are not currently approved
to do so and are not persons for which the religious institution should be
currently responsible. Most Christian denominations use the distinction
between ordination and licensing, so that the distinction could be made
more meaningful, if more formalized, as a means for distinguishing those
under supervision from those who are not at the appropriate time. For other
religious institutions, whether Christian or non-Christian, organized on a
local, congregational basis, there are no equivalent difficulties because
either the clerical or lay leader is employed or not employed by the local
organization that is responsible. Undoubtedly there are other institution-
specific solutions beyond the competence of the author to devise which
would reflect the need to differentiate those holding formal appointments
from those who do not.
It remains to add that a failure by a religious institution to adopt some
of these suggestions or some other method of distinguishing those who are
subject to oversight from those who are not, should not be interpreted as
an admission of oversight sufficient to attract legal liability. The factual
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link must always be established between institution and the perpetrator
of wrongful acts. Rather, these are simply suggestions to set out the links
more clearly for litigation purposes. On the basis of the cases to date,
the courts have shown considerable sensitivity to the internal structural
organizations of the institutions which have appeared before them.
Counsel should be encouraged to set out as clearly as they are able the
internal governance structures of religious institutions and how alleged
perpetrators of wrongful acts are or are not linked to that structure. There
is no reason to suspect that courts will fail to continue to do so in the
future so as to ensure that legal liability will only be attached to religious
institutions when they are factually responsible.
Conclusion
Although the final outcome in Cavanaugh remains to be seen in respect to
the class action against the headmaster and the college for alleged abuses
against the students, the final adjudication of the decision against the
diocese, dismissing the case against it, appears to be correct on the facts
alleged in the certification motion. Nevertheless, the case raised important
issues about the limits of liability of religious institutions in relation to
vulnerable persons, and demonstrated that the trajectory of Canadian cases,
of which it is a part, is sensitive to the complex relationship that religious
institutions have with their clergy and other persons who carry out their
mission. This is all the more remarkable since these relationships have
deep theological and historical roots of over several millennia in length.
While these cases are concerned with unfortunate and messy issues, the
courts have treated the complexities of religious institutions with great
care, so that religious institutions should continue to be confident in
providing spiritual and pastoral services to their members and the wider
community.
